INTRODUCTION
The overlap between ALS and frontotemporal dementia (FTD) is well established on a neuropathological, genetic and clinical level. [1] ALS patients with mixed features most commonly resemble behavioural variant FTD (bvFTD), characterized by abnormal personality, behaviour, and executive dysfunction. Severity of cognitive and behaviour change may range from intact to FTD, with 'subclinical bvFTD' in a significant proportion of cases. The cognitive profile of these patients is characterised by verbal fluency dysfunction, [2 3] linked to abnormalities in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, [3 4 ] although impairments in other executive and language functions have also been described. [3 5] Social and emotional cognition in ALS has only recently become the focus of research despite dysfunction of these processes being an early diagnostic feature of bvFTD [6] . Patients with bvFTD typically display deficits in Theory of Mind (ToM), empathy and emotion recognition. [7] [8] [9] ToM refers to a person's ability to infer mental states of oneself and others such as beliefs, preferences and intentions, and aids the understanding of other people's behaviour. Recent evidence indicates some dysfunction in ALS, [5 10 11] and deficits in ToM have now been reported using relatively complex cartoons and stories [5 11 12 13] (see [14] for a review). In parallel with FTD, ALS-patients have also shown impairment on a simple test of social cognition, the judgement of another's preference using the direction of eye gaze as a cue. Importantly this deficit was dissociated in ALS from the more typically reported executive dysfunction. [11 15 ] The ToM processes involved in this task have been further fractionated into Cognitive and Affective subcomponents, measuring the recognition of thoughts (beliefs and intentions) and feelings (emotions) of another respectively. [9] Deficits for affective judgement has been found in patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, a region typically showing early atrophy in bvFTD, while cognitive ToM has been suggested to be related to dysfunction of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However it is unclear which of these processes underlie the ToM deficit in ALS [16] Behavioural changes in ALS include apathy, disinhibition and irritability, and to a lesser extent, abnormal eating habits, stereotypical behaviours and sensory abnormalities. [5 11 17] Anosognosia (loss of insight) is also a prominent feature in bvFTD, [18] and has likewise been reported in ALS-patients, although may be restricted to those with bvFTD [17 abnormal performance on tests of social cognition and behaviour change in ALS or FTD. [21] Empathy and self-awareness are two key components important for effective social and interpersonal functioning. [22 23 ] Empathy is the capacity to not only recognize but experience the thoughts and feelings being experienced by another [8 15] and is clearly associated with Affective ToM. [9] Snowden et al. [15] posited that a lack of mental state attribution to others and failure to deviate from an egocentric perspective might give rise to abnormal empathy in FTD. ToM is also related to self-awareness, [23] and not only involves ascribing mental states to others but also to oneself. [24] Both these components have strong clinical relevance with diminished empathy [25] and loss of insight being associated with increased carer burden in Alzheimer's Disease and traumatic brain injury. [26] The present study investigated whether the ToM deficit recently described in ALS could be further delineated as one of Affective or Cognitive ToM and to explore the relationship between this social cognition deficit and the behavioural manifestations of empathy and self-awareness. The study aimed to determine whether this specific deficit was at the root of the clinical behavioural change present in some ALS patients.
MATERIALS & METHODS

Participants
Thirty three ALS-patients were recruited from four Scottish ALS clinics, and 26 healthy control participants through local community centres and the University of Edinburgh subject volunteer panel. All patients had a diagnosis of clinical possible, probable or definite ALS and none presented with overt dementia. [27] Participants were 27-80 years old, with English as a first language, normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing. Healthy controls were all screened for cognitive impairment using the Addenbrookes Cognitive ExaminationRevised [28] and scored within the normal range (96.6 ± 2.7, range 92 -100). None of the participants had other neurological, vascular, significant co-morbid medical problems, psychotic, mood (long standing history), substance abuse or developmental disorders.
Patients with a poor prognosis or marked respiratory dysfunction were excluded. The Hospital Anxiety & Depression Scale (HADS) [29] measured current depression and anxiety levels. One item ("I feel as if I am slowed down") was removed from analysis following Abrahams et al. [2] to prevent false exaggeration of the score by physical disability. Patients scored 34.7±7.1 on the Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis Functional Rating Scale -Revised (ALS-FRS-R), [30] but demonstrated normal respiratory function (subscore: 11.1±1.6). The Epworth Sleepiness Scale (ESS) [31] 
Neuropsychological Evaluation
Background Cognitive Tests
Executive functions were measured with the Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test [32] and the Verbal Fluency Index, both written (letters S-C) [4] and spoken (letters P-R-W), with higher scores indicating longer thinking times and worse performance [2] The two fluency measures were combined into one single performance measure as previous regression analyses supported the legitimacy of the merge. Visuospatial functions were assessed with the subtests Cubes and Number Location (Visual Object and Space Perception battery), [33] and language functions with the Graded Naming Test. [34] Experimental Paradigm: Cognitive-Affective Judgement of Preference Test
The Judgement of Preference test [9 11 ] was presented in E-prime 2.0, on a touch sensitive portable tablet PC. Participants, or if not possible, the experimenter touched the screen using a stylus after the participant had given a response. Participants were instructed to respond as accurately and as fast as possible. There were 8 blocks of 12 trials, yielding a total of 108 trials. A fixed sequence of blocks was presented although trials within each block were administered using a random selection without replacement. Six stimulus-categories were used: animals, cartoon-figures, fruits, vegetables, colours and furniture. Each category consisted of two sets of four object-pictures, presented in a fixed position on the screen.
White squares demarcated the four response areas on the screen (see Figure 1 ).
<Insert Figure 1 about here> Pre-experimental condition: Participants were asked to choose their own favourite objectpicture. The aim was to establish object-preference for each of the twelve stimulus-sets. Affective blocks, or vice versa. As can be seen in Figure 1 , the experimental conditions were similar to the pre-experimental condition, except that a cartoon face was located in the centre, with its gaze directed towards one of the pictures. To minimize memory demands, a question appeared at the top of the screen on each trial, presented simultaneously with the four objectpictures in each corner of the screen for 2000 ms, followed by the cartoon-face and arrow. All stimuli remained on the screen until the participant responded. The cartoon-face displayed one of four gaze directions: towards the upper left, upper-right, bottom left and bottom right corners. In the Affective trials, the face had a happy expression and participants were asked "Which picture does Dina love?", while in the Cognitive trials, the face had a neutral expression and participants were asked "Which picture is Dina thinking of?". In order to successfully complete the trials, participants were required to choose the picture the eye gaze of the cartoon face was directed to. The distracter trials were included to follow the same methodology as previously described. [11] If participants' attention would be captured by the arrow, then this likely indicated attentional or executive problems rather than a primary ToM deficit.
Control condition:
After the Experimental condition, participants were required to make judgements regarding physical attributes as opposed to thoughts or feelings. Three blocks were presented in a fixed sequence: Look at, Look at with distracter and Physical. The 'Look at' trials were identical to the Experimental conditions with the exception that the participants were now asked "Which picture is Dina looking at". In the Physical trials participants were asked "Which picture is Dina close to". The Control conditions were crucial to the task since participants may fail the Experimental condition either because of a genuine ToM deficit or attention or visual difficulties. Half of the trials contained a cartoon-face with either a happy or neutral expression.
Outcome measures: Errors were classified as follows: (1) Favourite -participant chooses the picture of his/her own preference as determined in the Pre-experimental condition, (2) Arrow -participant selects the object to which the arrow was pointing at, (3) Other -participant made an incorrect response which could not be classified as either Favourite or Arrow.
Self Awareness Assessment: Immediately after completing the Judgement of Preference test, participants were asked "How do you think you performed on this task?" and required to indicate their answer on a 10 centimetre visual analogue scale, which was divided into two parts: 'bad to very bad performance' (values between 0-5 cm) and 'good to very good performance' (values between 5-10 cm).
Behavioural Assessment
Participants and their informants (defined as someone who knew the patient very well, e.g. family member, spouse or close friend) completed a set of behavioural measures, including the Frontal Systems Behavior Scale (FrSBe), [35] Neuropsychiatric Inventory -Questionnaire (NPI-Q) [36] to uncover behaviours commonly observed in dementia and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) [37] to measure empathy using four scales: Perspective-Taking, Fantasy, Empathic Concern and Personal Distress. The NPI-Q was administered in informants only. In order to assess behavioural change, data on premorbid and post-illness functioning was obtained for the FrSBe and IRI.
Statistical analyses
Skewness of distributions was tested using the Shapiro-Wilk-statistic. Both parametric (Independent samples t-test, ANOVA) and non-parametric tests (Mann-Whitney U, Wilcoxon's signed ranks) were used depending on whether normality was satisfied or violated respectively. Frequency distributions were compared with the Pearson's χ2-test. A case analysis using z-scores was undertaken to identify patients with abnormal performance, defined as z≥2SD.
RESULTS
Background Cognitive Tests
The groups did not significantly differ on age, gender, education and HADS anxiety levels (see Table e-1) . Although patients displayed more depressive symptoms, the average score was very low, indicating few symptoms of depression. Patients showed normal performance on the Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test, however, deficits were noted for both the Verbal Fluency Index and Graded Naming Tests. Although patients scored significantly lower on Cube Analysis, the group difference was minimal, with patients' scores well above the abnormality cut-off from normative data. In addition, their Number Location performance was normal. Table 1 ). Healthy controls not patients, made marginally significantly more errors in the Look at -Distracter condition, although barely any errors were made. Withinsubjects analyses revealed no differences between distractor and non-distractor trials and <Insert Figure 2 
about here>
Analyses of the types of error committed revealed that ALS-patients made significantly more
Favourite, Other and Arrow errors than controls in the Affective condition only (see Table e- 2).
Self-Awareness of Performance: Despite committing more errors than controls ALS-patients exhibited similar scores on the self-rating of their performance as healthy controls (7.9 ± 2.1 vs. 8.1 ± 1.7; U=343.5, p=.91). 
Behavioural Assessment
Subgroup Comparison AFF-and AFF+
To explore the association between behavioural dysfunction, awareness and the social cognition deficit and due to the heterogeneity of performance on the Judgement of Preference task, ALS-patients were divided into two groups based on the errors made in the Affective conditions. The raw scores were subsequently converted into z-scores, and patients were classified as unimpaired affective ToM (AFF+, within 1SD from control mean) or impaired affective ToM (AFF-, greater than 2SD from control mean). Table 2 shows that AFF-patients had more pronounced deficits on the Verbal Fluency and Graded Naming
Tests than AFF+ patients. Performance of >2SD than control mean for FrSBe measures indicates abnormality, while for IRI, abnormality is defined by performance < 2SD, indicating less empathy; For Informant z-scores, healthy control data from 'current self-ratings' was used.
Subgroup analyses of the behaviour data revealed that compared to AFF+ patients, only abnormally self-rated Apathy on the FrSBe was more prevalent in the AFF-group (see Table   3 ). The NPI-Q was completed by two-thirds of informants in either subgroup. No significant differences emerged between the subgroups' frequency distributions on any of the NPI-Q items.
<Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here>
Subgroup Comparison COG-and COG+
For comparative purposes, ALS-patients were also divided into unimpaired cognitive ToM 36.0 ± 6.4; U=69.5, z=-1.6, p=.12). In contrast, COG-patients experienced a significantly longer disease duration than the COG+ patients (65.8 ± 37.4 vs. 26.2 ± 21.1 months; U=24.5, z=-3.0, p=.002), as well as longer thinking times on the VFI (see Table e -4) . None of the behavioural variables on the FrSBe, IRI or NPI-Q yielded significant group differences (see Table e -5). previous investigation which did not distinguish between affective and cognitive components, although 9/14 showed some deficit on the judgement of preference task, 5/14 (36%) showed dysfunction in the less executively demanding condition. [11] . In the current study 10/33 patients (31%) had deficits on a similar condition. Meir et al. [5] demonstrated that 33% of their 18 patients showed a deficit on the Faux Pas test, while in the study by Gibbons et al. [13] only 2 of the 16 patients were explicitly impaired (>2sd) on the experimental theory of mind tasks. Given the small sample sizes recruited through clinic rather than population based techniques, combined with the heterogeneity of presentation in ALS with the majority of patients not showing a deficit, these studies produce remarkably consistent findings indicating that a deficit in ToM is a key feature of the cognitive profile in this disease. The most prominent behavioural abnormality in the study was Apathy, consistent with numerous previous investigations[e.g 11 38) . Abnormal levels of apathy were present in 21%
Relationship of Affective and Cognitive ToM
of the sample and were disproportionate in those with a deficit in Affective ToM (42%) in comparison to those without (10%). Previous studies have found high levels of apathy with for example Lillo et al. [38] reporting that 41% of their sample displayed moderate-severe apathy. Variance is found between studies in methods of measurement of apathy and of ascribing abnormality. In the current study a closely matched control group was included and showed at least one behavioural feature on the NPI-Q, only 50-75% of participants completed inventories due to attrition or reluctance, leaving the behavioural profile of the remainder unclear. More recently designed questionnaires which minimize impairment due to motor dysfunction have been developed and which have revealed a lower rate of behavioural change than previously described [39] . Future studies should aim to develop more appropriate, motor-free questionnaires for a thorough understanding of behavioural functioning in ALS and other movement disorders.
Reduced awareness of cognitive deficit was also a prominent feature of this study. 70-90% of impaired Affective as well as Cognitive ToM patients rated their performance as good to very good on the task with 50-60% showing a particularly pronounced lack of awareness for their deficit, and thus displayed impairments both in ascribing mental states to others and to oneself. Loss of insight is a characteristic symptom of FTD. [18] and which has recently been revealed in ALS patients with cognitive impairment [19] . These results further highlight that a ToM deficit with a failure to recognize the thoughts and feelings of another and differentiate that from one's own, likely contribute to the cognitive underpinning of the behavioural manifestations of apathy and loss of insight in ALS.
On a clinical level, empathy and self-awareness are vital for effective social and interpersonal functioning. Legend: Black line indicates a z score of 2, cut-off for abnormality.
